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ABSTRACT
Software-based approaches for search over encrypted data are still
either challenged by lack of proper, low-leakage encryption or slow
performance. Existing hardware-based approaches do not scale
well due to hardware limitations and software designs that are not
specifically tailored to the hardware architecture, and are rarely
well analyzed for their security (e.g., the impact of side channels).
Additionally, existing hardware-based solutions often have a large
code footprint in the trusted environment susceptible to software
compromises. In this paper we present HardIDX: a hardware-based
approach, leveraging Intel’s SGX, for search over encrypted data. It
implements only the security critical core, i.e., the search function-
ality, in the trusted environment and resorts to untrusted software
for the remainder. HardIDX is deployable as a highly performant
encrypted database index: it is logarithmic in the size of the index
and searches are performed within a few milliseconds rather than
seconds. We formally model and prove the security of our scheme
showing that its leakage is equivalent to the best known searchable
encryption schemes. Our implementation has a very small code
and memory footprint yet still scales to virtually unlimited search
index sizes, i.e., size is limited only by the general – non-secure –
hardware resources.
1. INTRODUCTION
Outsourcing the storage and processing of sensitive data to un-
trusted cloud environment is still considered as too risky due to pos-
sible data leakage, government intrusion, and legal liability. Cryp-
tographic solutions such as Secure Multiparty Computation (MPC)
[10, 35] and in particular Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE)
[31] offer high degree of protection by allowing arbitrary computa-
tion on encrypted data. However, MPC and FHE schemes are still
impractical for adoption in large distributed systems [21, 32].
Moreover, there are a number of useful applications that only re-
quire a small set of operations rather than the universal solutions
offered by MPC/FHE. A prime example of such operations is the
search and retrieval in databases without the need to download all
data from the cloud. For searching over encrypted data, differ-
ent cryptographic schemes have been proposed such as property-
preserving encryption [9, 12], or functional encryption [14] and
its special case searchable encryption [24, 42, 49, 65]. In this con-
text, performing efficient and secure range queries are commonly
considered to be very challenging. CryptDB [59] resorts to order-
preserving encryption for this purpose which is susceptible to sim-
ple ciphertext-only attacks as shown by Naveed et al. [54].
As we will elaborate in our related work section, many schemes
for search over encrypted data supporting range queries require
search time linear in the number of database records. Recently,
schemes with polylogarithmic search time, based on an index
structure, have been proposed [25, 28, 49]. Nonetheless, the first
scheme in [49] is not yet practical, because it applies pairing-based
cryptography and also leaks sensitive information about the plain-
text, namely the order of the plaintexts. In contrast, [25] and [28]
presented approaches with polylogarithmic search time that utilize
only lightweight cryptography, that is, pseudorandom functions
and symmetric encryption. Out of the many schemes presented in
[25], the most secure approach, without false positives and bear-
able storage cost achieves practical deployability. However, it still
leaks much sensitive information, e.g., the search pattern and the
range size of each query. Hence, designing an efficient searchable
encryption scheme with minimal leakage on the queried ranges
remains an open challenge.
Another line of research [6, 7] leverages the developments in
hardware-assisted Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) for
search over encrypted data. Although Intel’s recently introduced
Software Guard Extension (SGX) [4,22,37,39,41,51] has inspired
new interest in TEEs, related technologies have been available
before, e.g., in ARM processors known as ARM TrustZone [5]
as well as in academic research [16, 45, 66]. Also, AMD has re-
cently announced a TEE for their CPUs [43] rising the hope that
TEEs will be widely available in x86 processors, and thus in many
relevant environments such as clouds, in the near future.
TEEs provide the secure isolation of sensitive data and compu-
tation in hostile environments. For instance, SGX loads applica-
tion code and data from main memory into an isolated memory,
which assures confidentiality and integrity of its data against mali-
cious software on the same system, including privileged software
like operating system (OS) or hypervisor. These properties are only
guaranteed as long as the TEE operates completely self-contained.
However, TEEs have to interact with untrustworthy components
within the same computer system for various reasons. In particular,
TEEs often have limited resources and need to utilize untrusted re-
sources of their host system. For instance, in case of limited mem-
ory it swaps out data to untrusted memory or storage. Hence, in or-
der to achieve comprehensive security, information leakage through
those channels has to be considered and taken care of. Previous so-
lutions for isolating databases with SGX load and execute the en-
tire unmodified database management system (DBMS) into an en-
clave [6, 7], but they do not consider possible side channels occur-
ring from the use of untrusted resources as well as resource sharing
between TEE and untrusted host. In particular, previous works do
not formally consider information leakage. Additionally, they do
not scale well due to the limited memory size of SGX’s enclaves
and the large footprint of the code they require in the TEE.
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Our goal and contribution. In this paper, we present an effi-
cient scheme for search over encrypted data using SGX that can di-
rectly be deployed as a database index. We utilize SGX’s protection
characteristics to achieve an outstanding tradeoff between secu-
rity, performance and functionality. The currently fastest software-
based schemes that support range queries are [25] and [28]. Our
solution significantly improves over these approaches in terms of
performance and storage. Compared to the latest hardware-based
schemes [6, 7], we improve in terms of security and scalability.
Our scheme organizes data in a B+-tree [8] structure that is fre-
quently used for databases indexes in most database management
systems (DMBSs) [1, 60], for data access [2] as well as for file
systems [33, 64] to vastly improve the performance of search op-
erations. Our solution support searches for single values and value
ranges. Additionally, our solution can be adapted easily to many
other database (search) operations.
We provide two constructions of our search scheme differing in
the management of the B+-tree. The tree is either loaded and han-
dled as a whole inside the enclave, or is loaded in an on-demand
fashion (see Section 5). Although the tree does not directly leak
information about the content of the (encrypted) index, it can leak
access patterns information observed during query processing. For
both constructions we show the access pattern leakage with respect
to side channels observable by an attacker. Furthermore, we show
that the leakage of both construction is almost the same differing
only by their granularity.
We implemented and extensively evaluated both constructions
on SGX-enabled hardware (see Section 6 and Section 7). The first
construction loads the whole B+-tree structure in an SGX enclave
and performs search queries thereafter. However, it is not possible
to load arbitrarily large structures into an enclave, as enclave size is
limited. We will detail this in Section 6. Our second construction
only loads those data in SGX that is currently needed to process
a search query. It has a very small code and memory footprint
in the TEE compared to other hardware-based approaches [6, 7].
Additionally, it scales to arbitrary index sizes, as memory usage in
the enclave is constant and untrusted resources are used to store the
database itself.
Our main contributions are as follows:
• Our scheme has logarithmic complexity in the size of index and
searches are performed within a few milliseconds.
• We formally model and prove our scheme secure showing that
its security (leakage) is comparable to the best known searchable
encryption schemes.
• We provide an implementation and evaluate the performance
and functional bottleneck of SGX on the basis of two different
constructions that are designed specifically for SGX to reduce
the Trusted Computing Base.
2. BACKGROUND
We will start by briefly introducing SGX towards which we de-
sign HardIDX. Note, our solution is not strictly limited to SGX and
could be used with any other system having a TEE with capabil-
ities similar to SGX (e.g., Sanctum [23]). Afterwards we explain
the basics of side channel attacks, which are a major concern for
HardIDX.
2.1 Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX)
SGX is an extension of the x86 instruction set architecture (ISA)
introduced with the 6th Generation Intel Core processors (code
name Skylake). We now present a high level overview of SGX’s
features utilized by HardIDX (see [4, 22, 37, 39, 41, 51] for more
details).
Memory Isolation. On SGX enabled platforms, programs can
be divided into two parts, an untrusted part and an isolated, trusted
part. The trusted part, called enclave in SGX terminology, is lo-
cated in a dedicated portion of the physical RAM. The SGX hard-
ware enforces additional protection on this part of the memory. In
particular, all other software on the system, including privileged
software like OS, hypervisor, firmware and code in system man-
agement mode (SMM) cannot access the enclave memory.
The untrusted part is executed as an ordinary process within the
virtual memory address space and the enclave memory is mapped
into the virtual memory of the untrusted host process. This map-
ping allows the enclave to access the entire virtual memory of its
host process, while the (untrusted) host process can invoke the en-
clave only through a well-defined interface. Furthermore, all iso-
lated code and data is encrypted while residing outside of the CPU
package. Decryption and integrity checks are performed when the
data is loaded inside the CPU.
Memory Management. SGX dedicates a fixed amount of the
system’s main memory (RAM) for enclaves and related metadata.
For current systems this memory is limited to 128 MB which is
used for both, SGX metadata and the memory for the enclaves
themselves. The latter is called Enclave Page cache (EPC) and is
about 96 MB according to our evaluations. The SGX memory is re-
served in the early boot phase and is static throughout the runtime
of the system. As the number of enclaves which may be loaded
and executed in parallel is virtually unlimited, the OS has to man-
age the enclave memory dynamically. The OS can allocate (parts
of) the memory to individual enclaves and change these allocation
during the runtime of the enclaves. In particular, the OS can swap
out enclave pages. SGX ensures integrity, confidentiality and fresh-
ness of swapped-out pages.
Attestation. SGX has a remote attestation feature which allows
to verify the correct creation of an enclave on a remote system.
During enclave creation the initial code and data loaded into the
enclave are measured. This measurement can be provided to an ex-
ternal party to prove the correct creation of an enclave. The authen-
ticity of the measurement as well as the fact that the measurement
originates from a benign enclave is ensured by a signature, pro-
vided by SGX’s attestation feature (refer to [4] for details). This
signature is provided by a component of SGX, called quoting en-
clave (QE). The QE accepts only measurements from the hardware
and the hardware ensures that only correct enclaves are measured.
Furthermore, the remote attestation feature allows for establishing
a secure channel between an external party and an enclave.
2.2 Side Channel Attacks
Side channel attacks allow an adversary to extract sensitive in-
formation without having direct access to the information source
by observing effects of the processing of the sensitive information.
Side channel attacks have been known for a long time and vari-
ous variants have been studied in the past, including hardware side
channels like ground potential, EM or power consumption [30];
software timing side channels that can be observed remotely [17] as
well as locally, e.g., through cache timing side channels [48,56,71].
However, all these side channel attacks are noisy and require re-
peated execution and measurements to extract the sensitive infor-
mation.
In the context of SGX there exist a new class of side channels,
called deterministic side channel [70]. As the OS is untrusted, yet
still manages the enclave’s resources, including enclave memory, it
can observe the enclaves behavior. In particular, the OS can gen-
erate a precise trace of the enclave’s code and data accesses at the
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Figure 1: System model
granularity of pages. In [70] it is shown that this allows to extract
sensitive information from an SGX enclave.
3. HIGH LEVEL DESIGN
Now, we will give a high level description of our design and
describe the general working of our scheme. Afterwards we explain
our attacker model.
3.1 HardIDX Overview
The high level design of our solution is shown in Figure 1a. The
design involves three entities: the client (who is the data owner and
therefore trusted), the untrusted SGX enabled server and the trusted
SGX enclave within the server.
Initially, a client prepares its data values (abbreviate with values
in the following) by augmenting it with (index) search keys. The
values are stored at pseudo-random position. The keys are then
inserted into a B+-tree and the storage order of all nodes is also
pseudo-random. The tree and values are linked by adding pointers
to the leaves of the tree identifying the random position of the cor-
responding values. A value can be any data such as records in a
relational database or files/documents in other database types. The
client then encrypts all nodes of the tree with a secret key SKk
and all data values with SKv . Then, it deploys the encrypted B+-
tree and encrypted values on the untrusted server in the cloud (see
step 1 in Figure 1a1).
In the second step, a secure connection is established between the
client and the enclave. The client uses the SGX attestation feature
for authenticating the enclave (see Section 6 for details). Through
this secure connection, the client provisions SKk into the enclave
(see step 2 ). This step completes the setup of our scheme, which
needs to be executed only once. Even when the enclave is unloaded,
e.g., due to a reboot, the state (including SKk ) can be securely
stored and restored from local memory [4].
From now on the client can send (index) search queries to the
server. Randomized encryption with the key SKk is used for all
search queries. Hence, the untrusted server cannot learn anything
about the query, not even if the same query was send before. When
a query arrives in the enclave, SKk is used to decrypt the query
(see step 3 ).
In step 4 , the enclave loads the B+-tree structure (tree nodes,
but no values) from the untrusted storage into enclave memory and
1For visualization purposes, the tree nodes and values are shown to
be encrypted as a block. In reality each node and value is encrypted
individually.
decrypts it. Given sufficient memory, the entire tree is loaded into
the enclave and the search is performed afterwards (see step 5 ).
However, as the tree size can exceed the memory available in-
side the enclave we provide a second design. In this case, only a
subset of tree nodes is loaded into the enclave. The tree is traversed
starting from the root node. When the search reaches an edge to
a node, which is currently not present in the enclave, it is fetched
from the untrusted storage.
In both cases the search algorithm eventually reaches a set of
leaf nodes, which holds pointers to data values matching the query.
This list of pointers, representing the search result, is passed to
the untrusted part (see step 6 ). The untrusted part learns nothing,
except for the cardinality of the result set, from this interaction,
because the values are stored in a randomized order.
The result of the index search can be processed further, e.g. in
combination with additional SQL operators, in the SGX enclave
at the server. In order to complete the end-to-end secure search
we assume that the server uses the pointers, in step 7 , to fetch
the encrypted values from untrusted storage and sends them to the
client. The client uses SKv to decrypt the received files.
Notably, the plaintext data values are never available on the
server. They are encrypted with strong standard cryptography
methods2 and never decrypted on the server, not even inside the
SGX enclave. The key to decrypt the data values is only know to
the client.
3.2 Assumptions and Attacker Model
We assume a system which provides SGX (or any TEE with ca-
pabilities similar to SGX). In particular, code and data inside the
TEE are protected with respect to their integrity and confidential-
ity. We further assume that the TEE provides means to establish
a secure channel to the client which allows secure communication
and secure provisioning.
Our attacker model is illustrated in Figure 1b. Due to SGX’s pro-
tection, the attacker cannot directly access the enclave. However,
side channels exist through, which the attacker could potentially ex-
tract sensitive information. In particular, the attacker aims to learn
the structure of the B+-tree which represents the order relation be-
tween the indexed data.
We assume the attacker has full control over all software on the
system running HardIDX. (1) The attacker can observe all interac-
tion of the enclave with resources outside the enclave. In particular,
the attacker can observe the access pattern to B+-tree nodes stored
outside the enclave. (2) The attacker can use deterministic page-
2Our implementation uses AES-128 in GCM mode
fault side channel to observe data access inside the enclave at page
granularity [70]. Through this side channel, the attacker can ob-
serve access patterns on the B+-tree stored inside the enclave. (3)
The attacker can use cache side channel to learn about code paths
or data access patterns inside the enclave, as SGX does not protect
against them [22].
Hardware attacks (in particular hardware / physical side chan-
nels) are out of scope in this paper. Furthermore, we consider de-
nial of service (DoS) attacks out of scope, as the untrusted server
could always refuse to serve the enclave. Similarly, the network
connection between the client and the server is vulnerable to DoS
attacks.
4. NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS
4.1 B+-tree
AB+-tree is a balanced, n-ary search tree. So called search keys
are utilized to index values. For instance, unique staff ids are used
to find the corresponding database record (see Figure 2). An index
could also be built for other information, e.g., the salary, and aB+-
tree is able to retrieve all records below or above a limit or between
limits. We abbreviate the search keys as keys throughout this pa-
per and clearly differentiate all other key types (e.g., cryptographic
keys) if ambiguous.
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Figure 2: B+-tree example (random storage position on the top):
the unique staff ids (inside the rectangles) are used as keys and the
values are the staff records. The records contain surnames, last
names and more attributes.
Three node types are differentiated in a B+-tree: the root node,
internal nodes and leaf nodes. Every node x contains x.#k keys
that are stored in a nondecreasing order: x.k1 ≤ ... ≤ x.kx.#k. At
every inner node x (including the root if not the only node), the keys
separate the key domain into (x.#k+1) subtrees that are reachable
by (x.#k + 1) child pointers: {x.p0, ..., x.p(x.#k)} = x.p. Every
key x.ki has a corresponding pointer x.pi that points to a node
containing elements greater than or equal to x.ki and smaller than
any other tag x.kj ∀j ∈ [i + 1, x.#k]. x.p0 points to a node
containing only keys, which are smaller than x.k1. No internal
node is linked to a value. Instead, every leaf node x stores x.#k
keys and a pointer to its corresponding value (x.p0 is not used at
the leaves). We denote the B+-tree without the values as B+-tree
structure. Every node x in the tree has a unique id x.id, a flag
stored in x.isLeaf if it is a leaf and we denote pxi as the storage
position of xi, i.e., the physical memory address.
We use unchained B+-trees, i.e., the leafs are not connected.
Linked leaves would increase the search performance, but it would
severely deteriorate the security. The reason is that a range query
would directly leak the relationship among leaves if links are fol-
lowed during a query.
In our constructions, it is not necessary to define the key domain
in advance as in many other approaches. It is not even necessary
that the domain is a range of integers. Instead, D can be an arbi-
trary domain with a defined order relation and a defined minimal
and a maximal element that can be recognized by the algorithms.
These two elements, denoted as −∞ and ∞, fulfill the following
condition: −∞ < x.k <∞ ∀x.k ∈ D.
The branching factor b specifies a B+-tree by defining the max-
imal number of pointers. b also defines the minimal number of
pointer for the different node types, but we do not further elaborate
on details. For ease of exposition, we assume that every key and
pointer fits in an 32 bit block, but this is no prerequisite for our
constructions.
4.2 Probabilistic symmetric encryption:
A probabilistic authenticated symmetric encryption consists of
three probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms PASE =
(
PASE_-
Gen(1λ), PASE_Enc(SK, v), PASE_Dec(SK,C)
)
. It provides
confidentiality, integrity and authenticity. PASE_Gen takes a
security parameter 1λ as input and generates a secret key SK.
PASE_Enc takes the key SK and a value v as input and returns a
ciphertext C. PASE_Dec takes the key SK and a ciphertext C as
input and returns k iff k was encrypted with PASE_Enc under the
key SK. Otherwise, it returns ⊥. PASE has to be an authenticated
IND-CCA secure encryption, e.g., AES-128 in GCM mode.
4.3 Hardware Secured B+-tree (HSBT)
Based on the presented definition of aB+-tree, we define the no-
tion of a Hardware SecuredB+-tree as follows. We assume that the
B+-tree should store a set s of n key-value pairs: s = ((k1, v1),
..., (kn, vn)). This set consists of n values v = (v1, ..., vn) and
their corresponding keys k = (k1, ...kn).
Definition 1 (HSBT). A secure hardware B+-tree scheme is a
tuple of six polynomial-time algorithms
(
HSBT_Setup, HSBT_-
Enc, HSBT_Tok, HSBT_Dec, HSBT_SearchRange, HSBT_Search-
Range_Trusted
)
.
Algorithms executed at the client:
SK ← HSBT_Setup(1λ): Take the security parameter λ as input
and output a secret key SK.
γ ← HSBT_Enc(SK, s): Take the secret key SK and a set s of
key-value pairs as input. Output an encrypted B+-tree γ.
τ ← HSBT_Tok(SK,R): Take the secret key SK and a range
R = [Rs, Re] as input. Output a search token τ .
v′ ← HSBT_Dec(SK,C′): Take the secret key SK and a set of ci-
phertext C′ as input. Decrypt the ciphertexts and outputs plain-
text values v′.
Executed at the server on untrusted hardware:
C′ ← HSBT_SearchRange(τ): Take a search token τ as input
and call the secure hardware function HSBT_SearchRange_-
Trusted. Output a set of encrypted values C′.
Executed at the server on secure hardware:
P ← HSBT_SearchRange_Trusted(τ): Take a search token τ
as input. Output a set of pointers P.
In the following definitions and constructions, we assume a pas-
sive attacker. This is important, as especially the correctness can
easily be thwarted by an active attacker. For instance, he can drop
results before they are transferred to the client. We present impli-
cations of an active attacker and countermeasures in Section 5.3.
Definition 2 (Correctness). Let D denote a HSBT-scheme consist-
ing of the six algorithms described in Definition 1. Given a passive
attacker, we say that D is correct if for all λ ∈ N, for all SK out-
put by HSBT_Setup(1λ), for all key-value pairs s used by HSBT_-
Enc(SK, s) to output γ, for all R used by HSBT_Tok(SK,R) to
output τ , for all C′ output by HSBT_SearchRange(τ), the values
v′ output by HSBT_Dec(SK,C′) are all values in s for which the
corresponding keys k′ fall in R, i.e., v′ = {vi|(ki, vi) ∈ s ∧ ki ∈
[Rs, Re] = R}.
Our security model, which we define next, is based on a three
step framework introduced by Curtmola et al. in [24]. The first
step is to formulate a leakage, i.e., an upper bound of the infor-
mation that an adversary can gather from the protocol. Secondly,
one defines the RealA(λ) and a IdealA,S(λ) game for an adap-
tive adversaryA and a polynomial time simulator S. RealA(λ) is
the execution of the actual protocol and IdealA,S(λ) utilizes S to
simulate the real game by using only the formulated leakage. An
adaptive adversary can use information learned in previous proto-
col iterations for its queries. Third, a scheme is CKA2-secure if
one can show that A can distinguish the output of the games with
probability negligibly close to 0. This in turn means thatA does not
learn anything besides the leakage stated in the first step, because
otherwise he could use this additional information to distinguish
the games.
At security models of searchable encryption schemes so far,
the leakage only covers the transaction between the client and
server. In our scenario, there is an additional transaction between
the server and the secure hardware that can be viewed by the ad-
versary. Therefore, we extend the CKA2-security to CKA2-HW-
security by introducing a new type of leakage denoted as Lhw. It
consists of the inherent leakage of the used secure hardware and
the inputs/outputs to/from the secure hardware.
Definition 3 (CKA2-HW-security). Let D denote a HSBT-scheme
consisting of the six algorithms described in Definition 1. Con-
sider the probabilistic experiments RealA(λ) and IdealA,S(λ),
whereas A is a stateful passive adversary and S is a stateful simu-
lator that gets the leakage functions Lenc and Lhw.
RealA(λ): the challenger runs HSBT_Setup(1λ) to generate
a secret key SK. A outputs a set of key-value pairs s =
((k1, v1), ...(kn, vn)). The challenger calculates γ ← HSBT_-
Enc(SK, s) and passes γ to A. Afterwards, A makes a poly-
nomial number of adaptive queries for arbitrary ranges R.
The challenger returns search tokens τ to A after calculating
τ ← HSBT_Tok(SK,R). A can use γ and the returned tokens
at any time to make a query to the secure hardware. The secure
hardware returns a set of pointers P. Finally, A returns a bit b
that is the output of the experiment.
IdealA,S(λ): the adversary A outputs a set of key-value pairs
s = ((k1, v1), ..., (kn, vn)). UsingLenc, S creates γ and passes
it to A. Afterwards, A makes a polynomial number of adaptive
queries for arbitrary ranges R. The simulator S creates tokens
τ and passes them to A. The adversary A can use γ and the re-
turned tokens at any time to make queries to S (that simulates the
secure hardware). S is given Lhw and returns a set of pointers
P. Finally,A returns a bit b that is the output of the experiment.
We say D is (Lenc,Lhw)-secure against adaptive chosen-keyword
attacks if for all probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms A, there
exists a probabilistic polynomial-time simulator S such that
|Pr [RealA(λ) = 1]− Pr [IdealA,S(λ) = 1] | ≤ negl(λ)
5. SEARCH ALGORITHMS
In this section, we will present two different constructions that
enable a client to the search for a single value or a range of values
based on keys. We use B+-trees in both constructions to achieve
logarithmic search and SGX to protect the confidentiality and in-
tegrity of the data.
5.1 Construction 1
We describe our first correct (according to Definition 2) and se-
cure (according to Definition 3) construction in this section. The
guiding idea of the construction is that the entire data should be
stored and processed inside the enclave. The client constructs the
B+-tree locally, encrypts theB+-tree structure and the values with
SKk and SKv , respectively, and sends both to the cloud provider.
The SGX application gets deployed to an SGX capable server at a
cloud provider (see Section 2.1 for details).
Software measurement is used for remote attestation, i.e., to
prove to the client that the correct software is deployed on an SGX
enabled CPU. During the deployment, the application reserves an
SGX protected memory region. A secure transfer protocol between
client and server is used to deploy SKk inside the enclave. Thus
SKk is only known by the enclave’s process and the client. The
cloud provider and all other processes cannot access this key at any
point in time.
The next step is to load the B+-tree structure from an untrusted
to the isolated memory region and use SKk to decrypt the tree
nodes. It is important to note that the tree is still protected, because
all data inside the enclave is secured by SGX. The enclave is then
ready to receive search queries from the client.
Since the values can be very large, the data transfer to the enclave
can cause a severe performance overhead. We, therefore, store the
values outside of the enclave. A second reason is the limited size
of protected memory inside an enclave. Storing the values outside
of the enclave has no security implications as the values are en-
crypted with an authenticated IND-CCA secure encryption scheme
and they are stored in a randomized order. The untrusted part re-
ceives only pointers to the values from the trusted part and loads
them from memory or disk by itself.
We now describe the HSBT-scheme HSBT1 consisting of the six
algorithms
(
HSBT1_Setup, HSBT1_Enc, HSBT1_Tok, HSBT1_Dec,
HSBT1_SearchRange, HSBT1_SearchRange_Trusted
)
and uti-
lizing a pseudorandom permutation Π : {0, 1}λ×{0, 1}log2#x →
{0, 1}log2#x in more detail:
SK ← HSBT1_Setup(1λ): Use input λ to execute PASE_Gen two
times and output SK =
(
SKk , SKv
)
that the two instances
of PASE_Gen(1λ) output. SKv and SKk are kept secret at the
client. SKk is additionally shared with the server enclave using
a secure transport and deployment protocol. The enclave stores
SKk inside the isolated enclave.
γ ← HSBT1_Enc(SK, s): Take SK and s = ((k1, v1), ..., (kn,
vn)) as input. Start by storing all values v = (v1, ..., vn) in
a random order. An almost standard B+-tree insertion is used
for all keys. One difference is that every newly created node x
gets an id according to the creation order, i.e., the first node gets
id 0 (x.id = 0), the second id 1 (x.id = 1) et cetera. After
each pair is inserted, the empty position for keys and pointers in
the tree get filled up. More specifically, a node x that contains
x.#k keys from the domain gets filled with (b − 1 − x.#k)
keys ∞ and (b − x.#k) dummy pointers. Then, all keys and
pointers are padded to a length of 32 bit (as mentioned before,
this is no prerequisite of our solution). The ids are used by the
algorithm to store the nodes at pseudorandom positions: px =
Π(SKk , x.id). Now, we have a B+-tree in which every node
occupies the same storage space and the order of the nodes and
values is random. Finally, PASE_Enc(SKv, ·) is used to en-
crypt every value and PASE_Enc(SKk , ·) is used to encrypt ev-
ery node. The encrypted nodes and values form the encrypted
tree γ, which is protected by an authenticated IND-CPA secure
encryption.
τ ← HSBT1_Tok(SKk , R): Use input SKk and R = [Rs, Re] to
calculate τ ← PASE_Enc(SKk , Rs||Re) and output τ . Query
for all elements below Re or all elements above Rs can be cre-
ated by using Rs = −∞ or Re =∞, respectively.
v′ ← HSBT1_Dec(SKv,C′): Use input SKv to decrypt the
encrypted values C′ =
(
C0, ..., Cj
)
: v′ =
(
PASE_Dec(
SKv, C0), ..., PASE_Dec(SKv, Cj)
)
. Output v′.
Executed at the server on untrusted hardware:
C′ ← HSBT1_SearchRange(τ): Take the search token τ as in-
put, pass τ to the trusted part and return the result values (by
dereferencing the pointers): C′ =
(
C0, ..., Cj
)
. See Algo-
rithm 1 for details.
Executed at the server on secure hardware:
P ← HSBT1_SearchRange_Trusted(τ): Take the search token
τ as input, decrypt the token, perform a B+-tree traversal and
return the pointers that lead to values falling in the queried range
in a random order. The list with the currently processed nodes
(X) is shuffled to further hide the order. Note that the enclave
does not have to decrypt the nodes, because the client’s encryp-
tion was removed already and the CPU has plaintext access to
them. See Algorithm 2 for details.
Algorithm 1 HSBT1_SearchRange(τ)
1: results = HSBT_SEARCHRANGETRUSTED(τ )
2: return *results0, *results1, ...
Algorithm 2 HSBT1_SearchRange_Trusted(τ)
1: τPlain = PASE_Dec(SKk , τ)
2: parse τPlain as
(
Rs, Re
)
3: P = ∅ . Pointer list
4: X = {root} . Nodes list
5: whileX 6= ∅ do
6: Ptmp = ∅
7: x =X.POP( )
8: if not x.isLeaf && Rs < x.k1 then
9: Ptmp.ADD(x.p0)
10: end if
11: for i = 1; i < b− 1; i++ do
12: if (x.ki ≤ Rs < x.ki+1) || (x.ki ≤ Re < x.ki+1) ||
(Rs ≤ x.ki && x.ki+1 ≤ Re) then
13: Ptmp.ADD(x.pi)
14: end if
15: end for
16: if x.kb−1 ≤ Re then
17: Ptmp.ADD(x.pb−1)
18: end if
19: for p inPtmp do
20: if *p.isLeaf then
21: P.ADD(p)
22: else
23: X.ADD(*p)
24: end if
25: end for
26: X = random permutation ofX
27: end while
28: P = random permutation ofP
29: returnP
The construction is correct according to Definition 2, because it
performs a textbook B+-tree traversal (with an additional random-
ize step) inside SGX. Furthermore, it is based on a correct PASE-
scheme.
A substantial advantage of the approach to put the whole func-
tionality in an enclave is that SGX provides a high level of protec-
tion for the enclave memory and thus the B+-tree. One would
even assume that an attacker does not learn anything about the
tree traversal, because all operations are executed only in protected
memory. Unfortunately, SGX is not able to fully protect the access
pattern.
As mentioned before, we assume that an attacker is able to re-
veal the accessed pages during the B+-tree traversal. Each page
allocates 4 kB and every encrypted node consists of one or multi-
ple AES-blocks. Up to k = 4 kB/(o ·128 bit) nodes are contained
in one page if o AES-blocks are used by each node. Experiments
showed that 102 AES-blocks are used for each node if b = 100
and 32 bit keys and pointers are used. Therefore, even multiple
of those huge nodes fit within a single page. We use the notation
x ∈ ω to express that x is stored in page ω. The B+-tree nodes are
stored next to each other in memory and they fit in #ω = k/#x
pages Ω =
(
ω1, ...ω#ω
)
.
Next, we will prove the security of Construction 1. The first step
is to define the leakage functions that are based on the attack model
described in Section 3.2.
Lenc(s): Given the key-value pairs s = ((k1, v1), ...(kn, vn)),
this function outputs the amount n of values, the size of each
value and the amount of B+-tree nodes #x.
Lhw(s, T,R, t): Given the key-value pairs s, the plaintext B+-
tree T and the search range R and given point in time t, this
function outputs the pages access pattern P(s, T,R, t) and the
values access pattern ∆(s, T,R, t).
Loosely speaking, the pages access patternP(s, T,R, t) is a tree
that contains all pages in Ω that get accessed when the range R
is searched for. An edge in P from a parent to a child means
that the child page gets accessed after the parent page. More
formally, we define M as the set that contains pages, in which
leaf nodes are present that contain keys from the search range,
i.e., M = {ω |ω ∈ Ω ∧ x ∈ ω ∧ x ∈T ∧ x.isLeaf ∧
x.kj ∈R, j ∈ [1, b − 1]}. Additionally, we define x→parent1
as the parent node of x in T and x→parentl denotes the node
that is reached by moving l layers up in the tree T starting from
x. Now, we can specify the node set Y of P as Y = {ωi |ωi ∈
M}⋃{ωi |ωj ∈ M ∧ x1 ∈ ωj ∧ ωi ∈ Ω ∧ x2 ∈ ωi ∧ x2 ∈
T ∧ x2 == x1→parentl, l ∈ [1, h − 1]}. The edge set of P
is {(ωi, ωj) |ωi, ωj ∈ Y ∧ ∃x1, x2 ∈ T : x1 ∈ ωi ∧ x2 ∈
ωj ∧ i 6= j ∧ x1 == x2→parent1}. The time parameter t de-
fines a snapshot of the random (but fixed) order of sibling nodes
at a given point in time. See Figure 3 for an illustrative example.
The values access pattern ∆(s, T,R, t) is defined as the pointers
to the result values together with the pages that contain nodes in
which these pointers are stored. More formally, ∆(s, T,R, t) =
{(ω,Pω) |ω ∈ Ω ∧ x ∈ ω ∧ x ∈ T ∧ x.isLeaf ∧ ∃x.kj ∈
R, j ∈ [1, b−1]∧Pω = {x.pl |x ∈ ω∧x.kl ∈ R, l∈ [1, b−1]}.
The time parameter t defines a random but fixed order of the
pointers.
The pages access pattern and the values access pattern are worst
case estimations. An attacker would require many queries to ex-
actly determine which page is a child of another page in P . The
same applies for the exact matching of result values to a page.
Theorem 1 (Security). The secure hardwareB+-tree construction
HSBT1 is
(Lenc,Lhw)-secure according to Definition 3.
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Figure 3: Illustration of page access pattern leakage: (a) exam-
ple B+-tree T (page containing the node on the top), (b) leakage
P(s, T,R, t) for R = [33, 55] and B+-tree T at t1, (c) leakage
P(s, T,R, t) for R = [33, 55] and B+-tree T at t2
Proof. We describe a polynomial-time simulator S for which
a PPT adversary A can distinguish between RealA(λ) and
IdealA,S(λ) with negligible probability.
• Setup: S creates a new random key S˜K = PASE_Gen(1λ) and
stores it.
• Simulating γ: S gets Lenc and creates #x nodes X =(
x1, ..., x#x
)
filled with random keys, random pointers and
increasing node ids. These nodes are stored in the pages(
ω1, ...ω#ω
)
. Additionally, S generates n encryptions of ran-
dom values C =
(
C1, ..., Cn
)
using PASE_Enc, the number of
values and the size of the values. Every encrypted value is given
a distinct index. S outputs γ = (X,C)
All described operations are possible, because the amount n of
values, the size of each value and the amount of nodes #x are
included in the leakage. The simulated γ has the same size as
the output RealA(λ) and the IND-CPA-security of PASE makes
the nodes indistinguishable from the output of RealA(λ).
• Simulating τ : The simulator S creates two random values (r1
and r2) and encrypts them: τs = PASE_Enc(S˜K, r1), τe =
PASE_Enc(S˜K, r2). S outputs τ = (τs, τe).
The simulated τ is indistinguishable from the output of RealA(λ)
as a result of the IND-CPA-security of PASE.
• Simulating secure hardware: At time t, the simulator S receives
a range token τ and Lhw. S uses P(s, T,R, t) to simulate the
page access pattern. For this task, S starts at the root of P and
follows the links as unambiguously defined by t. Afterwards, it
outputs P =
⋃
w Pω for every (ω,Pω) ∈ ∆(s, T,R, t). The
leakage ∆ determines the order of the pointers in P for a spe-
cific point in time t.
A cannot distinguish between the page access of RealA(λ)
and the simulated access, because the page access pattern de-
livers deterministic results. Therefore, the results are consistent
for different requests of the same range and also for queries of
distinct or overlapping ranges. Furthermore, the number of re-
sult pointers matches and the pointers are consistent, because
∆(s, T,R, t) is unambiguous. The values pointed on are in-
distinguishable, because they are protected by IND-CCA secure
encryption.
Cloud computing enables the fast and cost-effective processing
of large amounts of data. Unfortunately, Construction 1 suffers
from the substantial problem mentioned before: the memory re-
served for SGX is limited to 128 MB, and only about 96 MB can
be used for data and code. SGX supports a larger enclave size, but
enclave pages have to be swapped in and out in this case. Our eval-
uation (see Section 7) shows that even 50,000,000 values are pos-
sible. A B+-tree, however, is only a small part of a full encrypted
DBMS based on our constructions. Other components would oc-
cupy large regions of the restricted enclave memory and thus fur-
ther limit the available space. For that reason, we present a second
construction in the next section that does not have this problems.
5.2 Construction 2
In this section, we describe our second correct (according to Def-
inition 2) and secure (according to Definition 3) construction. In-
stead of loading all nodes into the enclave the main idea is to only
load the nodes required to traverse the tree. The challenge is to opti-
mize the communication bottleneck between the untrusted part and
the enclave. We performed extensive benchmarking and algorithm
engineering in order to identify and minimize the most important
run-time consuming tasks, such as switching between the untrusted
part and the enclave. The decisive advantage of our second con-
struction is that the required memory space inside the enclave is
O(1) for a tree of arbitrary size. The trade-off is that all nodes are
stored encrypted inside main memory or on disk and thus have to
be decrypted by the enclave. This also leads to a slightly larger
leakage than in the first construction, namely a finer-granular ac-
cess pattern on node instead of page level (details are described by
a formal model and proof later in this section).
The setup of the HSBT-scheme is slightly different than in the
first construction in order to implement the described features. As
before, the B+-tree is constructed and encrypted at the client and
is then transferred to the cloud provider. However, the applica-
tion does not reserves memory for the whole B+-tree structure in-
side the enclave. Instead, it only reserves a fixed space, denoted
as reservedSpace, for on the fly processing. The remote attesta-
tion and secure key deployment are performed as in the previous
construction.(
HSBT2_Setup, HSBT2_Enc, HSBT2_Tok, HSBT2_Dec, HSBT2_-
SearchRange, HSBT2_SearchRange_Trusted
)
is a second HSBT-
scheme consisting of six algorithms that utilizes a pseudorandom
permutation Π : {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}log2#x → {0, 1}log2#x.
All algorithms but HSBT2_SearchRange and HSBT2_Search-
Range_Trusted exactly match the descriptions of Construction 1.
In contrast to Construction 1, these two algorithm get extended by
the parameter γ and nodes, respectively, because it is required to
pass the encrypted tree and the encrypted nodes inside the enclave.
We now describe the modified algorithms:
C′ ← HSBT2_SearchRange(τ, γ): Take the search token τ and
the encrypted tree γ as input. At the beginning, pass only the
root node to the trusted part and receive pointers to nodes that
should be traversed next. The trivial solution is to pass one node
after another to the enclave. A severe problem with this design is
that every context switch from the untrusted to the trusted part or
back causes a substantial overhead. We therefore optimized the
number of context switches: transfer as many nodes as currently
in the queue, but not more than fit into reservedSpace. We de-
note the maximal number of nodes as maxAmount, which is di-
rectly influenced by the space reserved inside the enclave during
the setup process: maxAmount = reservedSpace/(o · 128 bit)
where o is the number of AES-blocks used by each node. Nodes
are passed until no further are requested. Then output C′ by
dereferencing pointers to the values. See Algorithm 3 for details.
P ← HSBT2_SearchRange_Trusted(τ,X): Take a search to-
ken τ and nodes X as input. Every incoming node is encrypted
with SKk . During the setup phase, SKk was deployed inside
the secure hardware. Therefore, the algorithm is able to decrypt
all nodes and the token. Then, search all keys falling in the query
range, whereby all keys are accessed. Finally, return the corre-
sponding pointers in a random order. See Algorithm 4 for details.
Algorithm 3 HSBT2_SearchRange(τ, γ)
1: X = ∅ . FIFO queue
2: X.ENQUEUE(root)
3: results = ∅
4: whileX 6= ∅ do
5: for i=0; i <X.size && i < maxAmount; i++ do
6: Xtmp =X.DEQUEUE( )
7: end for
8: resultstmp = HSBT2_SEARCHRANGETRUSTED(τ ,Xtmp)
9: for (isLeaf, p) in resultstmp do
10: if isLeaf then
11: results.ADD(*p)
12: else
13: X.ENQUEUE(*p)
14: end if
15: end for
16: end while
17: return results
Algorithm 4 HSBT2_SearchRange_Trusted(τ,X)
1: τPlain = PASE_Dec(SKk , τ)
2: parse τPlain as
(
Rs, Re
)
3: Xtmp = {PASE_Dec(SKk , *X0), PASE_Dec(SKk , *X1), ...}
4: P = ∅
5: for x inXtmp do
6: if not x.isLeaf and Rs < x.k1 then
7: P.ADD(x.p0)
8: end if
9: for i = 1, i < b− 1, i++ do
10: if (x.ki ≤ Rs < x.ki+1) || (x.ki ≤ Re < x.ki+1) ||
(Rs ≤ x.ki && x.ki+1 ≤ Re) then
11: P.ADD(x.pi)
12: end if
13: end for
14: if Re ≥ x.kb−1 then
15: P.ADD(x.pb−1)
16: end if
17: end for
18: P = random permutation ofP
19: return (*P0.isLeaf, P0), (*P1.isLeaf, P1), ...
The construction is correct according to Definition 2, because
it is based on a textbook B+-tree traversal. The difference to the
textbook algorithm is that the nodes are loaded inside the enclave
after another and that each node is encrypted. These changes do not
influence the correctness, because each node remains accessible to
the enclave and the encryption (at the client) and the decryption
(inside the enclave) are based on a correct PASE-scheme.
We prove the security of Construction 2 by again defining the
leakage functions that are based on the attack model described in
Section 3.2.
Lenc(s): Given the key-value pairs s = ((k1, v1), ...(kn, vn)),
this function outputs the amount n of values, the size of each
value and the amount of B+-tree nodes #x.
Lhw(s, T,R, t): Given the key-value pairs s, the plaintext B+-
tree T , the search range R and given point in time t, this func-
tion outputs the nodes access pattern X (s, T,R, t) and the value
pointers access pattern ∆(s, T,R, t).
The nodes access pattern X (s, T,R, t) is a tree that contains
the storage positions of all nodes in T that get accessed when
searching for the range R. For a more formal definition, we de-
note the set of leaf nodes that contain keys from the range as M ,
i.e., M = {x |x ∈T ∧ x.isLeaf ∧ x.kj ∈R, j ∈ [1, b− 1]}.
We again denote x→parentj as the parent node of x that is
reached by moving j layers up in the tree T starting from x.
Here, we denote a node that only contains the storage position
of a node xi as yi. Now, we can specify the node set Y of X
as Y = {yi |xi ∈M} ∪ {yi |xi ∈ T ∧ x ∈ M ∧ xi ==
x→parentj , j ∈ [1, h − 1]}. The set of directed edges in X is
{(yi, yj) | yi, yj ∈ Y ∧ ∃xi, xj ∈ T : xi == xj→parent1}.
The time parameter t defines a snapshot of the random (but fixed)
order of sibling nodes at a given point in time. See Fig. 4 for an
illustrative example.
The value pointers access pattern ∆(s, T,R, t) is defined as
the pointers to the result values together with the leaf nodes in
which these pointers are stored. More formally, ∆(s, T,R, t) =
{(x,Px) |x ∈ T ∧ x.isLeaf ∧ ∃x.kj ∈ R, j ∈ [1, b − 1] ∧
Px = {x.pl |x.kl ∈ R, l∈ [1, b − 1]}}. The time parameter t
defines a random but fixed order of the pointers.
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Figure 4: Illustration of nodes access pattern leakage: (a) exam-
ple B+-tree T (random storage position on the top), (b) leakage
X (s, T,R, t) for R = [33, 55] and B+-tree T at t1, (c) leakage
X (s, T,R, t) for R = [33, 55] and B+-tree T at t2
Theorem 2 (Security). The secure hardwareB+-tree construction
HSBT2 is
(Lenc,Lhw)-secure according to Definition 3.
Proof. The simulator S works as follows:
• Setup: S creates a new random key S˜K = PASE_Gen(1λ) and
stores it.
• Simulating γ: S gets Lenc and creates #x nodes filled with
32 bit random keys and random pointers. Every node xi gets
a unique node id xi.id ∈ [0,#x] and the node is stored at the
position pxi = Π(S˜K, xi.id). The nodes get encrypted with
PASE_Enc(S˜K, pxi). Additionally, S generates n encryptions
of random valuesC =
(
C1, ..., Cn
)
using PASE_Enc, the num-
ber of values and the size of the values. Every encrypted value
is given a distinct index. S outputs γ = (X,C).
All described operations can be executed by S, because the in-
formation required for the encryption of values is included in
the leakage. The simulated γ has the same size as the output of
RealA(λ) and the IND-CCA security of PASE makes the nodes
and values indistinguishable from the output of RealA(λ).
• Simulating τ : The simulator S creates two random values r1
and r2 and encrypts them: τ ← PASE_Enc(SKk , Rs||Re). S
outputs τ .
The simulated τ is indistinguishable from the output of RealA(λ)
as a result of the IND-CCA security of PASE.
• Simulating secure hardware: At time t, the simulator S receives
encrypted nodes (denoted as X), a token τ and Lhw. It has to
simulate the output of the secure hardware enclave. The simula-
tor decrypts every node xi ∈ X with PASE_Dec(S˜K, xi). We
differentiate between two cases for every xi:
1. xi is not leaf: S reads the id of xi and searches the corre-
sponding yi in X (s, T,R, t). It returns a pointer to all chil-
dren in the order defined by t.
A cannot distinguish between the output of RealA(λ) and
the simulated output, because the pointers point to indistin-
guishable nodes according to the IND-CCA security of PASE.
Furthermore, the results are consistent for different requests
of the same range as the nodes access pattern delivers de-
terministic results and the pseudorandom permutation creates
unambiguous positions for the simulated nodes. The same ar-
gument applies for queries of distinct or overlapping ranges.
2. x is leaf: S uses the leakage ∆(s, T,R, t) to output all re-
sult pointers P =
⋃
x Px, ∀ (x,Px) ∈∆ in the order defined
by t.
This output is indistinguishable from the output of RealA(λ)
as the number of result pointers matches and the pointers are
consistent because ∆(s, T,R, t) is unambiguous. The values
pointed on are indistinguishable, because they are protected
by IND-CCA secure encryption.
The main difference in the leakages of Construction 1 and Con-
struction 2 is the granularity of the tree and value pointers access
pattern. In the second construction, the attacker is able to reveal
accesses on a node level. In contrast, the attacker is able to reveal
accesses on a page level in the first construction, because SGX in-
herently leaks the page access pattern.
5.3 Active attacker
Construction 1 and 2 are secure and correct for a passive attacker,
but our overall goal is to enable the outsourcing of data to untrusted
cloud providers. Therefore, it is important to consider active at-
tackers. This attacker type tries to thwart the correctness and tries
to gain additional sensitive information by not following the de-
fined protocol. We omit concrete definitions of correctness and
CKA2-HW-security under a active attacker, because they are eas-
ily deducible from Definition 2 and Definition 3. In the following,
we consider only Construction 2, but the arguments and techniques
can be applied to Construction 1 with minor modifications.
Attack vectors. We identified two basic attack vectors that cover
a wide range of possible attacks. Firstly, the attacker can try to at-
tack the protection mechanisms of SGX to gain insights about data
and algorithm execution not under his control. We rely on SGX’s
protection mechanism that guarantees security and correctness un-
der an active attacker. However, as defined in our attacker model
(see Section 3.2), we consider various side channels. Protection
mechanisms against these are implementation details and thus de-
scribed in our implementation section (Section 6). Secondly, the
active attacker can try to influence the data and protocol execution
that is under his control. Namely, all encrypted nodes, encrypted
values, encrypted tokens and the HSBT2_SearchRange algorithm.
He can do this to gain additional sensitive information or to prevent
the client from getting the correct result. In this section, we present
arguments and protection mechanisms that address this second at-
tack vector.
For now, we assume that there is a mechanism that guarantees
the following to the client: if it gets a result, all results in the re-
sponse match the query and the response contains all matching re-
sults. This mechanism is presented later in this section, but we first
consider the correctness and security implications of this assump-
tion. We show that there are no security implications by introducing
an active attacker instead of an passive attacker.
Unprotected static data. The only static data influenceable by
the active attacker are values and nodes. The security of this data is
guaranteed by using an authenticated IND-CPA secure encryption
scheme. The authenticated encryption also thwarts attacks on the
correctness that try to modify or add static data, because these ac-
tions are noticed by the decryption algorithm. We do not consider
the deletion of values or nodes, because it would lead to incomplete
results and thus contradict the assumption stated above.
Unprotected dynamic data. The only dynamic data influence-
able by the attacker is the search token. Again, the security of to-
kens and the prevention of modifications and additions is provided
by the authenticated IND-CPA secure encryption scheme. A replay
attack does also not give any additional information to the attacker
as the tree is static and the leakage stays the same for a replayed to-
ken. The correctness could only be influenced by a denial of service
(DoS) attack by dropping tokens, but DoS is out of scope according
to our attacker model.
Unprotected algorithms. HSBT2_SearchRange is the only re-
maining untrusted part under control of the active attacker. There
is only a fixed set of deviations from the protocol that do not lead
to a DoS. As explained before, all additional or modified static or
dynamic data is directly noticeable by the enclave, which can sim-
ply reject further processing. Passing less nodes than possible to
the enclave only slows down the process, but does not lead to addi-
tional information and does not impact the correctness.3 The only
remaining deviations are: (1) do not pass the root node first to the
enclave, (2) pass the wrong nodes to the enclave (3) do not pass all
requested nodes to the enclave and (4) do not pass all results to the
client. It is important to note that all these deviations do influence
the correctness of the protocol, but not the security. We now first
present some straightforward, but problematic alternatives. After-
wards, we explain our mechanism that ensures the stated assump-
tion and defends against the four possible deviations.
One straightforward way to protect against deviations (2) - (4) is
the usage of a Merkle tree structure (like done in [49]). It would be
possible by transferring all values of a leaf node that contains any
3Passing one node after another is already covered by the defined
leakage.
matching value, the hashes of the matching nodes and the hashes of
any sibling of all matching nodes. Together with a stored root hash,
the client can check the hashes bottom-up. However, this requires
to transfer more data than necessary, leaks unnecessary information
by touching sibling nodes and requires additional processing at the
client.
A further method to prevent against deviations (2) and (3) is to
store a list of requested node ids inside the enclave. For every in-
coming node, the enclave removes the corresponding id from the
list and can be sure that it received all and only correct nodes when
the list is empty. However, this approach requires O(r) storage
inside the enclave for the total result size r.
Deviations (4) can be mitigated by using the secure channel cre-
ated during provisioning to transfer the results. Technically, it is
possible, because the enclave has direct access to the values. Never-
theless, it would also require O(r) additional storage to memorize
r result pointers. Additionally, it would not give any additional pro-
tection, because the data access are perceivable by untrusted soft-
ware.
We now present modifications to Construction 2 that do not ex-
hibit the drawbacks of the Merkle tree approach and do not require
O(r) additional storage in the enclave. We utilize so called multi-
set hashes [20] as a building block to prevent the deviations (2) -
(4) with only O(1) additional storage. The properties of a multi-
set hash are: multiple values are hashed to a fixed-size bit string,
elements can be added incrementally and efficiently, the order of
the input can be arbitrary and there is an efficient equality check
for two multiset hashes. Two multiset hashes are equal if the hash
was calculated over same elements (independent of the order). As
a concrete example, MSet-XOR-Hash from [20] can be used as a
multiset hash. We refer to [20] for details and a security proof that
is based on the hardness of breaking the underlying pseudorandom
functions.
The construction of theB+-tree is changed in the following way:
the root node and every inner node x store the child id x.chIdi
next to the pointers x.pi; every leaf node x stores a hash x.hashi
of the plaintext values next to the pointers x.pi. The id of the root
node root.id is sent to the enclave together with SKk in the secure
channel established during the setup phase.
In the following modifications, we abbreviate the two algorithms
of Construction 2 (i.e., HSBT2_SearchRange and HSBT2_Search-
Range_Trusted) as Untrusted and Trusted. For every node
x that Trusted receives, it decrypts the node and checks if x.id
matches root.id. If this is the case, it creates a new nonce. Other-
wise, it expects to receive a nonce from Untrusted. The process-
ing aborts if no nonce is present and any node but the root node was
passed. This thwarts deviation (1).
For every nonce, Trusted stores how many nodes it expects at
the moment in expectedNodesAmount and it stores three mul-
tiset hashes: expectedNodesHash, receivedNodesHash and
resultV aluesHash. For the root and every inner node x, it adds
x.chIdi for every expected child to expectedNodesHash. For
each received node x, it adds x.id to receivedNodesHash. It
then processes the nodes as before. In each leaf node x, it checks if
x.ki falls into the range. x.hashi is added to resultV aluesHash
if this is the case. Finally, it passes the list of pointers and the nonce
to Untrusted.
expectedNodesAmount is reduced for every incoming node.
After reaching expectedNodesAmount = 0 and adding the last
ids of each received node to receivedNodesHash, Trusted com-
pares expectedNodesHash with receivedNodesHash. If these
hashes do not match, it did not receive the correct nodes from
Untrusted, aborts and deletes the nonce. Thus, the algorithm
guarantees that it traversed all nodes that might contain an eligi-
ble result and thereby protects against deviation (2)4 and (3). Oth-
erwise, it adds x.hashi to resultV aluesHash for every result
found in the last search round and returns the pointers together with
an HMAC over resultV aluesHash. Untrusted adds the HMAC
to the client response. After the decryption, the client calculates a
multiset hash over the received values, creates an HMAC and com-
pares it with the received HMAC. The HMAC comparison protects
against deviation (4).
Summarizing, the client is guaranteed the stated assumption
through the presented mechanism. Performance measurements
showed that the described protection mechanisms introduce an
overhead of about 0.3ms at a query result size of 100.
5.4 Multiple users
So far, we considered a setup comprising one user, but multi-
ple user directly supported by HardIDX. Multiple users are able
to concurrently query data without limitations, as concurrent tree
traversals do not influence each other. The only requirement is that
each user has access to the key SKk to create query tokens and
SKv to decrypt the result. It is also possible that each user shares
a different key SKk with the enclave. This would hide the search
pattern of one user from all other users, but it requires a small mod-
ification in the protocol: the token has to be accompanied by client
information, because the enclave has to identify the key to use for
the token decryption. The nodes can be encrypted by any key that
is known to the enclave. Particularly, it is not required to be a key
shared with any user.
6. IMPLEMENTATION
Subsequently, we elaborate on implementation details, which are
important with respect to performance or security.
Platform. Our HardIDX implementation is based on Intel’s
Software Development Kit (SDK) for SGX. Services like attesta-
tion are available through the interfaces of the SDK. The hardware
platform is described in the evaluation (see Section 7).
Provisioning. As described before, the client initially provisions
SKk to the enclave. This has to be done securely since SKk
should not be revealed to any untrusted party. We use the attes-
tation feature of SGX to establish a secure channel between the
client and the enclave. As described in Section 2.1, the initial en-
clave memory content is measured during its creation. The first
operation performed by the enclave is the creation of a key pair
(secret key skE and public key pkE). The randomness required
for the key generation is provided by the hardware random num-
ber generator (rdrand [40]) available in current CPUs. As the
enclave’s memory is isolated, skE is never revealed to any other
party.
Next, the enclave sends its just created pkE to the quoting en-
clave (QE). The QE creates an signature over both, the measure-
ment of the initial memory content of the enclave (ME) (i.e., the
code and static data) and the public key: σQE(ME ||pkE). ME ,
pkE and σQE(ME ||pkE) are sent to the client who verifies the
signature (given Intel’s public key). The client also verifies the
measurement of the initial enclave state to establish trust into this
enclave instance (i.e., only if the measurement matches a known
value she will continue). The client then encrypts SKk with pkE
and sends it back to the enclave, which is the only entity that can
4The attacker does not gain additional information from the pro-
cessing of wrong nodes. The reason is that the algorithm would not
request them and thus already leaks that they do not contain values
from the range.
decrypt SKk . Subsequently enclave and client share SKk , which
they use for secure communication.
Side channels. Our implementation is concerned with three
types of (side) channels: external resource access, page-fault side
channel and cache timing side channel (see Section 3.2). In particu-
lar, by means of all three channels an adversary can observe access
patterns to memory with the goal of inferring sensitive information
from the observed access patterns.
In HardIDX, access to external resources by the enclave is lim-
ited to B+-tree nodes. Here, the attacker’s goal is to leak infor-
mation about the tree structure and ultimately the order of values
stored in the database and searched for by the client. Our Construc-
tion 2 explicitly covers the access to external resources, i.e., nodes,
in its leakage.
While the external resources used by HardIDX store only data,
page-fault side channel and cache timing side channels allow to
observe access to enclave memory which contains both, data and
code. These side channels do not reveal sensitive data directly.
However, they might reveal access to memory locations, which can
reveal sensitive information if the memory access to code or data
differs depending on sensitive data.
As before, the attacker’s goal might be to extract information
about the tree structure and the order of values stored and searched.
Additionally the attacker might try to extract cryptographic secrets
from the enclave. For instance, the attack might aim at learning the
secret key SKk used to encrypt tree nodes or learning one of the
keys used during the establishment of a secure channel in the initial
provisioning phase.
The page-fault side channel allows the attacker to reliably ob-
serve memory access patterns, however, the granularity is relatively
coarse (4 kB). All accesses within the same page are indistinguish-
able for the attacker and, thus, are not exploitable. Construction 1
explicitly considers the leakage of the tree structure through this
side channel. In Construction 2 the page-fault side channel does
not leak additional information, as nodes are smaller than memory
pages and the nodes access pattern is leaked anyway by storing the
B+-tree outside of the enclave.
Cache timing side channel allow finer grained memory access
observations while being less reliable. Nevertheless, assuming an
adversary who is able to observe accesses within a node, the at-
tacker needs to determine which links to child nodes are followed.
Our algorithm, however, accesses every key and pointer, whether
the pointer is followed or not. By this and other fine grained imple-
mentation details, we achieve data independent accesses and thwart
the cache timing side channel.
Leakage of cryptographic keys are thwarted for page-fault and
cache timing side channel by using leakage resilient implementa-
tions and hardware features [11]. For instance, the AES implemen-
tation used in HardIDX uses AES-NI hardware which holds the
S-Boxes in CPU registers instead of RAM, thus hampering cache
side channel attacks [52, 69].
Memory Management. We implemented both constructions of
HardIDX. In particular Construction 2 is optimized with respect
to memory transfer operations, and context switches between un-
trusted and trusted part. To reduce the number of context switches
a list of requested nodes is hold by the untrusted part. Nodes from
this list are transfered and processed at once, i.e., with only one
switch. The memory transfer is optimized by exploiting the fact
that the enclave can access the memory of its host process. The
B+-tree is loaded in the host process’ memory from where the en-
clave can fetch nodes directly, decrypt them and process them. This
is much more efficient than copying nodes explicitly into enclave
memory before decrypting and processing them.
7. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we present our evaluation results collected in a
number of experiments. First, we compare our two constructions
described in Section 5. Then, we examine the effects of the differ-
ent ways of memory management for the constructions. Finally, we
compare our solution against the currently fastest polylogarithmic
range query search algorithm presented in [25, 28].
Platform. Our evaluation system was equipped with an Intel
Core i7-6700 processor at 3.40 Ghz (i.e., sixth generation Core-
i7, code name Skylake) and 32 GB DDR4 RAM. 64-bit Ubuntu
14.04.1 extended with SGX support (e.g., EPC management) was
used as operating system. We evaluate our implementation on a
real SGX hardware and provide actual measurements.
7.1 Construction 1 vs. Construction 2
First, we compare the performance of our two constructions. The
parameters of the B+-tree are held constant for this comparison:
the branching factor is 10 and the tree contains 1,000,000 key-
value pairs. Queries with five different sizes of the result set are
used: 20, 24, 28, 212, 216. The search ranges were selected uni-
formly at random and every result size is tested with 1,000 differ-
ent ranges. Figure 5 depicts the results of this evaluation, whereby
the x-axis shows the size of the result set and the y-axis shows the
median of the run-times in ms.
Figure 5: Comparison of constructions
The performance difference can be explained by the following
effects:
• Processor mode switch. Before executing inside an enclave,
the processor has to switch into “enclave mode”. This includes,
e.g., storing the current CPU context on the host process’ stack
and loading the CPU context of the enclave. In Construction 1
only one switch is required, whereas in the Construction 2
O(logb n) switches are performed, as at least each level of the
B+-tree is loaded into the enclave.
• Data transfer. In Construction 1, the data transfer between
trusted and the untrusted code is limited to the result set and
the query whereas in Construction 2 also part of the B+-tree is
transferred between the two components.
• Access to plain data. In Construction 1, decryption is a one-
time effort after loading the entire B+-tree into the enclave.
During query processing, it has access to plaintext nodes of
the B+-tree. Construction 2 incrementally loads the B+-tree
nodes from untrusted storage. All processed nodes need to be
decrypted during query processing.
Construction 2, therefore, is slower than Construction 1 by a
small factor at any result size. For an increasing size of the result
set, both algorithms search a linearly increasing part of the tree.
Figure 5 shows that the run-times of our two constructions con-
verge (on a logarithmic scale). This shows that the effects described
above diminish compared to the search time of the algorithm.
7.2 Memory Management
In order to identify the limiting parameters in the memory man-
agement of our two constructions, we evaluate B+-trees with dif-
ferent tree sizes (amounts of key-value pairs) and branching factors.
On each tree we ran 1,000 randomly chosen queries with result set
size of 100 and tested with the branching factors 10, 25, 50 and
100. The results of these evaluation are depicted in Figure 6a and
Figure 6b. The x-axis shows the size of the B+-tree and the y-axis
shows the median run-time of the queries.
(a)
(b)
Figure 6: Effect of different branching factors in (a) Construction 1
and (b) Construction 2
In Figure 6a, we see a sharp increase of the run-time above a tree
size of 106 records. This is due to the exhausted memory in SGX
and the virtual memory mechanism of the operating system that
swaps pages in and out. This is not security critical, since pages
remain encrypted and integrity protected by the SGX system, even
when they are swapped out of the SGX protected memory.
We see a significant difference in the impact of paging between
the different branching factors. This becomes clear by consider-
ing the number of required page swaps. The lower the branching
factor, the higher the number of nodes in a B+-tree. The higher
the number of nodes, the higher the number of accesses to different
memory pages. The higher the number of different page accesses,
the higher the probability of a swapped out page.
In Figure 6b, we see that Construction 2 is not affected by pag-
ing, albeit supporting an unlimited tree size. Our data also shows
that, as expected, higher branching factors result in better perfor-
mance. Disregarding the paging problem of Construction 1 above
a tree size of 106 records, a direct comparison of the constructions
reveals that the runtime of Construction 2 approaches the runtime
of Construction 1 for higher branching factors.
7.3 Comparison with related work
In this section, we compare our Construction 2 against the cur-
rently fastest approach with comparable security features and a se-
curity proof presented by Demertzis et al. in [25]. The authors
present seven different constructions that support range queries.
The constructions have different tradeoffs regarding security, query
size, search time, storage and false positives. We do not compare
against the highly secure scheme with prohibitive storage cost and
also exclude the approaches with false positives as our construction
does not lead to false positives. Instead, we compare against the
most secure approach without these problems: Logarithmic-URC.
We assume that the OXT construction from [18] is used as
underlying symmetric searchable encryption scheme (SEE) by
Logarithmic-URC. Fundamentally, the SSE scheme is changeable,
but the authors of [25] also utilize OXT for the security and perfor-
mance evaluation. One has to note that a quite equal construction
as Logarithmic-URC was presented independently by Faber et al.
in [28]. We implemented the algorithm of [25], but a security and
performance comparison to [28] would lead to comparable results.
Table 1 compares our Construction 2 and Logarithmic-URC. In
this evaluation, we use a branching factor of 100 for Construction 2
and search for a randomly chosen range that contains 100 results.
Every test for the four different tree sizes (100, 1,000, 10,000,
100,000) was performed 1,000 times and the table shows the mean.
Tree Size 100 1,000 10,000 100,000
Logarithmic-
URC 0.015 s 0.020 s 0.051 s 1.052 s
Const. 2
(b = 100) 0.119 ms 0.121 ms 0.124 ms 0.125 ms
Table 1: Time comparison of random range queries with
Logarithmic-URC [25] and our Construction 2
Our construction runs in about a tenth of a millisecond and with
very moderate increase for all tree sizes. In contrast, Logarithmic-
URC requires at least multiple milliseconds up to a seconds for
bigger trees. A reason for the performance difference might be
that OXT construction itself is less efficient then our construction.
Furthermore, the search time of OXT depends on the number of en-
tries. Logarithmic-URC fills the OXT construction with elements
from a binary tree over the domain for every stored key. An in-
creasing domain severely increases the tree height of a binary tree
and thus the number of entries for OXT. In contrast, the height of
theB+-tree in our construction increases much slower with the tree
size.
A functional difference between Logarithmic-URC and Con-
struction 2 is that Logarithmic-URC requires to fix the search key
domain beforehand. Cover a huge domain does negatively influ-
ence the setup and search time. In our construction, it is not nec-
essary to fix the domain and the domain size has no performance
implications.
It is not trivial to compare Logarithmic-URC and Construction 2
regarding security. The access pattern leakage and the leakage of
the internal data structure of Logarithmic-URC is comparable to
our access pattern leakages. However, Logarithmic-URC addition-
ally leaks the domain size, the search range size and the search
pattern. The search pattern reveals whether the same search was
performed before, which might be sensitive information. Further-
more, our construction only requires index storage in O(n) instead
of in O(n logD) as in Logarithmic-URC.
8. RELATED WORK
Our work is related to searchable encryption, encrypted databases
and secure implementations based on a TEE (e.g., SGX).
8.1 Searchable encryption
Song et al. introduced in [65] the first searchable encryption
schemes for single plaintexts. In order to improve performance,
Goh [34] and Curtmola et al. [24] introduced encrypted (inverted)
indices. However, these encryption schemes can only search for
keyword equality and not ranges.
Searchable encryption scheme supporting range queries are rare.
Table 2 shows a comparison of different searchable encryption
schemes and other schemes that support range queries. Note that
all existing range-searchable encryption schemes leak the access
pattern – including ours. The first range-searchable scheme by
Boneh and Waters in [15] encrypt every entry linear in the size of
the plaintext domain. The first scheme with logarithmic storage
size per entry in the domain was proposed by Shi et al. in [63].
Their security model (match-revealing) is somewhat weaker than
standard searchable encryption. The construction is based on inner-
product predicate encryption which has been made fully secure by
Shen et al. in [62]. All of these schemes have linear search time.
Lu built the range-searchable encryption from [62] into an index
in [49], thereby enabling polylogarithmic search time. However,
his encrypted inverted index tree reveals the order of the plaintexts
and is hence only as secure as order-preserving encryption. Wang
et al. [67] proposed a multi-dimensional extension of Lu [49], but
it suffers from the same problem of order leakage. There is no
known searchable encryption schemes for ranges - until ours - that
has polylogarithmic search time and leaks only the access pattern.
A Lu implementation done by us requires several seconds or
minutes for a single range search, even with a security parameter
much weaker than ours. Hence, we not only improve asymptotic
search time, but more importantly reduce the constants in order to
open application to much larger data sets.
ORAM can in principle be used to hide the access pattern of
searchable encryption. However, Naveed shows that the combina-
tion of the two is not straightforward [53]. Special ORAM tech-
niques, like TWORAM [29], are needed.
8.2 Encrypted Databases
Encrypted databases, such as CryptDB [59], use property-
preserving encryption for efficient search. Property-preserving
encryption has very low deployment and runtime overhead due
to the ability to use internal index structures of the database en-
gine in the same way as on plain data. Order-preserving encryp-
tion [3, 12, 13, 44] allows range queries on the ciphertexts as on
the plaintexts. With order-revealing encryption [19, 46] a general-
ization of order-preserving encryption has been published recently.
However, Naveed et al. [54] initiated the research direction of prac-
tical ciphertext-only attacks on property-preserving encryption, in
particular order-preserving encryption, which recover the plain-
text in many cases with very high probability (close to 100%) and
further attacks followed [26, 36].
There have been a number of attempts to build indices for range
queries based on deterministic encryption. Bucketization of cipher-
texts [38] groups ciphertexts on the server and filters results at the
client. Wang et al. [68] uses distance-revealing encryption in or-
der to build an r-tree. Li and Omiecinski [47] use prefix-preserving
encryption in order to build a prefix tree for range searches. How-
ever, all of these approaches are susceptible to the same attacks
(and worse) as those by Naveed et al.
Four further approaches for a secure DBMS allowing range
query evaluation have been published: Firstly, Cash et al. [18]
introduce a new protocol called OXT that allows evaluation of
boolean queries on encrypted data. Faber et al. [28] extend this
data structure to support range queries but either leak additional
information on the queried range or the result set contains false
positives. In [25], Demertzis et al. present several approaches
for range queries. The authors also evaluate the security and per-
formance based on the OXT protocol. The scheme that is most
comparable to ours, Logarithmic-URC, is quite equal to the range
query approach without false positives from [28] and thus exhibits
equal additional leakage. We provide an experimental comparison
in Section 7.3. Secondly, Pappas et al. [57] evaluate encrypted
bloom filters using Secure Multiparty Computation. However, in
order to achieve practical efficiency they propose to split the server
into two non-colluding parties. Our approach does not require any
additional party. Thirdly, Egorov et al. [27] presented ZeroDB.
A database system that enables a client to perform equality and
range searches with the help of B+-trees. ZeroDB is an interactive
protocol requiring many rounds and thus is not usable for network
sensitive cloud computing. Fourthly, Arx was presented by Poddar
et al. [58]. The authors propose a binary tree that uses garbled
circuits at any node to evaluate the traversal direction in a protected
manner. Any traversal destroys the visited garbled circuits where-
fore the client has to provide new circuits in an additional round
or with the next query. This interactive reparation step seriously
reduces the usefulness in a highly concurrent cloud scenario, be-
cause any query involving intersection ranges requires sequential
processing.
8.3 TEE-Based Applications
Trusted Database System (TDB) uses a trusted execution envi-
ronment (TEE) to operate the entire database in a hostile environ-
ment [50]. While TDB encrypts the entire database storage and
metadata (e.g., tree structures to organize the data), TDB is not con-
cerned with information leakage from the TEE. Neither does TDB
aim at hiding access patterns nor does it consider side channels at-
tacks against the TEE. Furthermore, since the entire DB operates in
the TEE the trusted computing base is very large exposing a very
large attack surface.
Haven is an approach to shield application on an untrusted sys-
tem using SGX [7]. The goal of Haven is to enable the execution
of unmodified applications inside an SGX enclave. This technique
could be used to isolated off-the-shelf databases with SGX, how-
ever, Haven does not consider information leakages through mem-
ory access patterns or interactions with the untrustworthy outside
world. Furthermore, this approach limits the size of the database
due to limited enclave size.
VC3 (short for verifiable confidential cloud computing) adapts
the MapReduce computing paradigm to SGX [61]. Mapper and
Reducer entities are executed in individual enclaves, this means the
data flow between them can leak sensitive information. While VC3
is tailored towards SGX they exclude information leakage from
their adversary model. In contrast, we provide the first work on
SGX that specifically focuses on information leakage in the inter-
action of an enclave with other entities.
Data-oblivious machine learning for SGX was presented in [55].
Four machine learning algorithm have been adapted by the authors
in order to prevent the exploitation of side channels. All data and
code accesses that are dependent on sensitive data are transferred
into data-oblivious accesses by using a library providing a set of
Scheme Search time Query Size Storage Size Search Pattern Leakage Order Leakage
Boneh, Waters [15] O(nD) O(D) O(nD) yes no
Shi et al. [63] O(n logD) O(logD) O(n logD) yes no
Shen et al. [62] O(n logD) O(logD) O(n logD) no no
Lu [49] O(logn logD) O(logD) O(n logD) no yes
Demertzis et al. [25]
Faber et al. [28] O(logR) O(logR) O(n logD) yes no
Poddar et al. [58] O(logn) O(logn) O(n) no yes
This paper O(logn) O(1) O(n) no no
Table 2: Comparison of range-searchable encryption schemes. n is the number of keys, D is the size of the plaintext domain and R is the
query range size.
data-oblivious primitives. Access to external data, specifically in-
put data, is addressed by randomizing the data and always access-
ing all data, i.e., their solution has an complexity of O(n), even for
tree searches. HardIDX, in contrast, has a complexity of O(logn)
in the tree size, by following the same approach as [55] we could
trivially achieve data-oblivious access to the tree since the nodes of
our tree are randomized as well. However, we would lose a main
feature of our construction: search time complexity of O(logn).
9. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduce HardIDX – an approach to search
for ranges and values over encrypted data using hardware support
making it deployable as a secure index in an encrypted database.
We provide a formal security proof explicitly including side chan-
nels and an implementation on Intel SGX. Our solution compares
favorably with existing software- and hardware-based approaches.
We require few milliseconds even for complex searches on large
data and scale to almost arbitrarily large indices. We only leak the
access pattern and our trusted code protected by SGX hardware is
very small exposing a small attack surface.
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